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HOW THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH VIEWS THE ‘ RUSSIAN
WORLD’1
Thomas Bremer
Thomas Bremer is a professor of Ecumenical Theology, Eastern Church studies, and peace research as a
member of the Catholic Theological Faculty at Münster University in Germany. The topics of his
interests are Orthodox Churches in Eastern and Southeastern Europe (Russia, Ukraine, the Balkans), the
role of religions in political processes, and the theory of ecumenical relations. He is a member of the
Board of Advisory Editors of OPREE.

Abstract
The cultural concept of a “Russian world” (Russian: “russkiy mir”) plays an increasingly
important role today, and is not limited to political discourse. The Russian Orthodox Church
(ROC), which officially joined the “Russian World” foundation in 2009, has frequently referred
to Russkiy mir in recent discourse. The term “Russian world” refers to a culture that
differentiates itself from Western culture and is superior to it. Despite ROC usage of the term,
understanding of Russkiy mir is diffuse. There are still some semantic constants which occur
repeatedly. The most significant of these are a) the historical aspect, b) religion or religious
origin, c) values, and d) supranational character. The Russkiy mir concept has gained even more
significance during the latest event in Ukraine.

The Historical Content
The historical dimension contains a twofold perspective, directed both forward and
backward. The Russian world is perceived as a concept that originated in previous generations.
The term Rus, which comprises the pre-modern peoples and forms of governments of the East
1
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Slavs, refers to the community of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians during the entire time
“in which we had a unified country, regardless of the prevailing political system” (according to
Patriarch Kirill on November 3, 2009). Therefore the historical commonalities between the East
Slavs are emphasized and these have weight not just for the present day but also for the future.
Furthermore, the Russian world guarantees the cohesion of these nations in the future, regardless
of contemporary political boundaries. It is therefore seen as something like a predetermined
community, from which the constituent nations cannot secede, even if they would like to form
other political entities. The culture extends deeper than political units.

Religion, Religious Origins, Values
As concerns the role of religion in the Russian world, the RO’s stance is ambivalent.
Naturally, Orthodoxy is considered to be the religious basis of Russian culture. Even in speeches
by the Russian president, the common baptismal font of Kiev, that is, the Christianization of the
Rus at the end of the 10th century, out of which the Orthodox Church of Russia and its
neighboring countries emerged, is often apostrophized. However, the religious facet of this
concept is not exclusive. A significant role is assigned to Islam in particular, both as one of the
traditional religions in Russia (according to the preamble of the religious law of 1997) and as a
religion where shared values are defended. Above all, this concept functions as a contrast to
Western European religious communities (generally with the exception of the Catholic Church),
who are ostensibly unsuccessful at influencing their society or upholding Christian traditions.
Genuine or perceived prohibitions against religious symbols in Western Europe (judgments
against displaying crucifixes, the secularization of religious holidays, and so on) cause the
representatives of the ROC to emphasize the meaning of religion and religious symbols in the
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public arena. So this is a matter of suggesting that religion in Russian society should be
important and dominant. Its public witness goes along with this fact, but also a greater shaping of
societies according to religious principles.
These principles are described in the discourses of the ROC as, above all, moral values.
Fundamentally, they transcend religion. As the Patriarch asserted on September 6, 2014, these
values are: “in the culture to which we belong Biblical values, or for those who do not recognize
the Gospel and belong to other religions, the values of their own religion, which are in moral
regard consonant in many respects with Christian teachings.” There are several concrete
expressions of such values, as for example, “piety, patriotism, love of fellow man, justice,
harmony between nations and between religions, the striving for knowledge, industriousness, and
respect for our elders.” It is because of the prevalence of these values that the countries of the
Russian world can assume an esteemed place in human society. These assertions often go along
with anti-Western sentiment, namely that these postulated values have been either forgotten in
the West or replaced with others. An important role is ascribed to the difference between
personal and community values. Whereas the West emphasizes the individual and his or her
freedoms, it neglects the rights of groups, for example, nations or religious communities (and the
family is also included here); correspondingly, religious freedom is demanded as a group right,
not primarily as an individual one.

Language
According to the views of the ROC, this does not mean unity or uniformity in the Russian
world. In fact, the different languages, cultures, and religious traditions of these people should be
retained. This will have the following result, according to the Patriarch: “that there will be no
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first or second rate peoples.” The Russian world is portrayed as a place with traditional variety,
which certainly rests on common societal assumptions, but does not result in homogeneity. The
frequently used concept of “the countries of the Russian world” implies that there can and should
be different governmental systems.
This is also evident in this next element: language. There is no doubt that the Russian
language assumes an important role. Church representatives emphasize its preservation and
cultivation. But that doesn’t necessarily mean that the other languages are of secondary
importance. The church communities of the ROC in other countries are urged to support
language learning, so that above all younger generations do not forget the language of their
origin. But the Patriarch emphasizes that it is also completely possible that courses in Ukrainian,
Belarusian or Moldavian might be offered where needed.
Language is not understood simply as a cultural bound to one’s (former) homeland, but
just as much as a testimony to Orthodoxy. In an address, Patriarch Kiril reproaches young people
who like to speak with a foreign accent, accusing them of rejecting “the Russian language,
Russian culture, and Orthodox beliefs.” This is interesting insofar as the Church, in its inmost
essence, specifically in the liturgy (religious worship service), rejects Russian itself and conducts
the service exclusively in Church Slavic. In Ukraine, however, the parishes which are part of the
community of the ROC are permitted to conduct their services in Ukrainian. Since the not
canonically Orthodox churches in the Ukraine permit their priests this privilege, it is likely that
the ROC was under great pressure to do the same. However, the use of the modern written
language is not permitted in Russia.
But how do the representatives of the ROC view the importance of the nation or the
political space constituted by the Russian world? We might say at the outset that the Russian
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world is specifically understood as a supranational entity. The ROC, too, defines itself in its
official rules as a multinational church. The Russian world refers to the Rus, not to Russia.
Therefore it is open to all peoples who consider themselves members of this cultural unit,
regardless of their national belonging.

Supranational Character
We might ask the question: how fully committed do the citizens of other nations wish to
be to the Russian world? This does not seem to be a problem for church officials. Metropolitan
Ilarion, the unofficial deputy of the Patriarch, refers to “peoples who have always considered
themselves one unified people and who continue to represent themselves as a unified culturalreligious entity.” From the point of view of the people themselves, this idea can be understood as
assimilation, but this point of view is not shared by the ROC. Behind this expression, we see the
idea that modern political boundaries do not vitiate cultural unity. As a rule, however, the phrase
‘the Russian world’ means the Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldavia. Sometimes other countries are
mentioned, as for example, Kazakhstan.
The fact that the Russian world is divided among several countries implies a process of
integration. And in fact, church representatives compare this process with the one that the
European Union has experienced. At the same time, there is an emphasis on the idea that because
of their common religious roots, the process of integration in the Russian world could progress
more successfully than in the EU. At the same time, it is also noteworthy that the ROC has
worked intensively to influence political processes within the EU. It maintains a delegation in
Brussels and important church officials regularly attempt to meet with and advise the highest
officials of the EU.
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The Political Enterprise and the Views of the ROC
It is evident that the exact way the ROC views its role in the Russian world cannot be
defined specifically, but remains vague. In fact, it is often contradictory. There is no master plan
that the church would seek to realize behind it, but rather an attempt to define and occupy a role
for the ecclesial and religious dimension of the entity that is in harmony with political realities.
The ROC has not acted in this arena but reacted.
That the concept does not lend itself to definitive political initiatives can be seen by the
fact that the Russian world defines itself as supranational. That is part of the reason for the lack
of clarity in church thinking in this area. Nevertheless, we can assert that there is in fact a unity
of goals between the political project “the Russian world” and the aims of the church.
In the everyday life of the church, the Russian world concept plays no significant role;
however, representatives of the ROC do appear at events like “the Worldwide Council of
Russian Peoples” (in Russian: “Vsemirniy russkiy narodniy sobor”) and gain relatively
widespread publicity thereby. There is scarcely any evidence for changing such projects into
concrete political realities. Just as the worldwide centers of “Russkiy mir” largely confine
themselves to language courses for non-Russian speakers and libraries for Russians abroad, we
do not see the church congregations in foreign countries sponsoring any particular political
activities.
We still have to hold on to the idea that different political opinions within the ROC might
lead to tensions that could also affect the church’s attitude toward the Russian world. Such a
variety of attitudes could be seen a few years ago in the case of the “Pussy riot”. At the moment,
this multiplicity of views mostly affects the Ukraine. The church affiliated with the ROC (the
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Ukrainian Church of the Moscow Patriarchate) is facing division. The large majority of the
parishes identify themselves with the Ukraine and presently, they are attempting to achieve
ecclesiastical independence; several parishes have already switched to the uncanonical Kyiv
Patriarchate. The result is relatively restrained statements from church authorities on the
Ukrainian question since the leaders of the ROC know that if they promulgate a clear position,
they stand to lose a large percentage of the faithful in Ukraine. In that case, their concept of the
Russian world would also be lost. While we can speculate today as to whether this concept has
been realized as the Eurasian customs union on a political level, on the ideal plane, we are left
with the banal statement that there is a common history of the East Slavic nations. But for
shaping the present, this fact seems to have no meaning at all.
Translated from German by
Erlis Wickersham, professor emerita
Rosemont College, PA
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